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RIGHT TO COUNSEL AT THE GRAND JURY STAGE
OF CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
WALTER W. STEELE, JR.*
I. INTRODUCTION
Criminal justice in the United States is administered in a series of
stages, ranging from the arrest stage at the beginning, to the parole stage
at the end. A person accused of crime is processed by being passed from
one stage to another. At any stage the accused person may be screened out
of the system altogether, or he may be passed along to the next stage for
further processing. For example, at the trial stage the accused is either ac-
quitted (screened out of the system) or he is convicted, and bound over for
sentencing (passed along to the next stage for further processing). In most
jurisdictions the grand jury is one of these stages in felony cases.' Histori-
*Associate Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University; LL.B. Southern
Methodist University; LL.M. University of Texas.
1. The fifth amendment states: "[n]o person shall be held to answer for a
capital or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a
grand jury." However, this aspect of the fifth amendment has never been made
applicable to the states. In Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884), the Supreme
Court held that due process of law did not require an indictment in all cases. See
also Oregon v. Miller, 458 P.2d 1017 (Ore. 1969). Since the decision in Hurtado
some states have dispensed with the necessity of indictments by grand juries. See
Younger, The Grand Jury Under Attack, 46 J. cGlm. L.C. & P.S. 214 (1955).
The following states provide that the prosecution of criminal cases may be com-
menced by the filing of an information or indictment at the option of the
prosecutor.
Arizona*-Aiuz. REv. STAT. ANN. R. CRitn. P. 78 &c 79 (1956); Arkansas-Aa.
CONsT. amend. XXI (1956); California*-CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 737 8C 738 (West 1970);
Colorado-CoLo. Rv. STAT. § 39-4-1 (1963); Connecticutt-GEN. STATS. CONN.
§ 54-46 (1968); Floridat-FLA. STAT. ANN. § 932.47 (1944); Idahot-IDAno CODE
§ 19-1301 (1948); Indiana-IND. STAT. ANN. § 9-908 (1956); Iowa-IowA CoDE ANN.
§ 769.1 (1950); Kansas*-KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 62-801 & 62-804 (1964); Louisiana-
LA. STAT. ANN., CODE ClUM. PROC. § 382 (1967); Michigan*-McH. Coesr. LAws
ANN., CODE CUAM. PRoc. §§ 767.1 & 767.42 (1968); Minnesota*-MNN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 628.29, 628.31 & 628.32 (1968); Missouri-Mo. CONST. art. I, § 17; § 545.010, RSMo
(1969); Montana-MNT. REv. CODE §§ 95-1501-95-1502 (1969); Nebraska*-PEv.
STAT. NEB. §§ 29-1601 & 29-1607 (1965); Nevada*-Nrv. R.v. STAT. §§ 171.196 &
172.015 (1967); New Mexico*-N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-6-1 (1963), amending § 35-4401
(1925). See also N.M. CONST. art. 2, § 14; North Dakota*-N.D. CENTURY CODE ANN.
§ 29-09-02 (1960); Oklahoma-OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 22-301 (1969); South Dakota*-
S.D. ComP. LAws ANN. §§ 23-2-5 e 23-36-1 (1967); Utah*-UTArH CODE ANN. §§ 77-
16-1 & 77-17-1 (1958); Vermontt-VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13 § 5651 (1958), as amended
(Supp. 1969); Washington-Rv. CODE WAst. § 10.37.015 (1961), as amended,
(Supp. 1969); Wisconsin*-Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 955.12 & 955.18 (1958); Wyoming-
Wyo. STAT., § 7-118 (1957).
*These states by statute specifically require a preliminary hearing as a
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cally, the grand jury performed a number of functions,2 but its essential
purpose now is to indict or no-bill an accused. Therefore, from the stand-
point of both the accused and the community the grand jury stage is quite
significant, because it is the gateway to the heart of the criminal justice
system-the trial and sentencing stages.
Since the grand jury proceeding can be the last hurdle prior to the
prosecution of a felony case, two questions naturally arise: (1) Is it a
"critical stage" where the accused must be afforded right to counsel, and
the appointment of counsel if he is indigent?3 (2) What functions can
counsel perform at the grand jury stage? The purpose of this article is to
search for answers to both of those questions. Admittedly, both questions
are somewhat dialectic because there is no right to counsel at the grand
jury stage according to the presently accepted rule of law in most juris-
dictions. 4 One commentator has summed up the law of right to counsel
at the grand jury stage as follows:
The institution of the grand jury frankly does not embrace
the concept of a defense counsel. There is no provision which in-
cludes him in any facet of the proceedings, and in fact many of the
rules have been deliberately drawn to exclude him. At no stage of
the grand jury process is there a legal right to counsel. It is not too
much to say that at its very essence the grand jury system is based
on the idea of preventing a defense.5
tThese states by statute allow the information to be substituted for in-
dictment only in non-capital cases.
The following states require a grand jury indictment in felony cases, but
specifically provide by statute that a defendant may waive indictment. Most of these
states allow a waiver only in non-capital cases and some of them require the
presence of counsel, consent of the prosecuting official, or a waiver by the defendant
in writing before the defendant will be allowed to waive the indictment by grandjury.
Alabama-CoDE oF ALA., Trr. 15, §§ 227 & 260 (1958); Alaska-ALAs. STAT. §
12.80.020 (1962); Delaware-DEr,. CODE ANN., Vol. 13A, Rutn SuPERIOR COURT
(CRIMINAL No. 7 (1953); Georgia-CoDE OF GA. ANN. § 27-704 (1953); Illinois-ILL.
ANN. STAT. § 38-111-2 (1970); Maine-ME. Rnv. STAT. ANN., Trr. 15, §§ 701 & 811
(1964); Maryland-ANN. CODE MD. Rurxs Nos. 708 &i 709 (1963); New Hampshire-
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 601:1 & 601:2 (1968); New Jersey-N.J. STAT. ANN. §§
2A:152-3 and 2A:7-25 (1952); North Carolina-N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15-137 9- 15-140.1(1965); Ohio-OHo REv. CODE ANN. § 2941.021 (1953), as amended, (Supp. 1969);
Oregon-OR. REv. STAT. § 131-010 (1969) and ORr. CONsT. art. VII, § 5, ad amended,
(1958); Pennsylvania-PA. STA. ANN. CODE CRIe. Paoc. Rs u Nos. 213 & 215
(1964), as amended, (Supp., 1970); Rhode Island-Gm¢. LAws R.I. § 12-12-19 (1956);
South Carolina-CoD or Lws oF S.C. §§ 17-401 & 17-516 (1962); Tennessee-TENN.
CoDE. ANN. §§ 40.1703 (1956) and 40-2015 (1956), as amended, (Supp., 1969);Virginia-CoDE OF VA. § 19-1-162 (1969).
Statutes in the following states require a grand jury indictment in felony cases.
Hawaii-HAwAII ~v. STAT. § 711-6 (1968); Kentucky-KY. REv. STAT. ANN.
RuuIS CRaIN. PROc. 6.02 (1969); Massachusetts-ANN. LAws MAss. Ch. 277, § 15
(1968); Mississippi-Miss. CODE ANN. § 2440 (1956), see also Miss. CONST. art. 3,
27; New York-N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROc. 4 (McKinney 1958); Texas-Tmx. CoNsr.
art. 1, § 10; West Virginia-W. VA. CODE § 62-2-1 (1966).
[Vol. 86
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RIGHT TO COUNSEL
To some extent, then, this paper will argue for a change in the present
state of the law. The argument will be presented in three parts. First, the
doctrine of right to counsel as a whole will be reviewed with particular
emphasis given those cases calling for counsel at various "critical stages"
in the criminal justice process. The next part of the paper will examine
the nature of grand jury proceedings from the standpoint of what, if any,
aspects of those proceedings are similar to other stages that have previously
been declared critical. The third part of the paper will evaluate and
analyze some of the case law dealing specifically with the question of right
to counsel at the grand jury stage.
II. THE CnRIcAL STAGE RATIONALE
What factors induce a court to extend the doctrine of right to counsel
to a particular stage in the criminal justice process? The answer to that
question is crucial to any discussion of whether or not the right should
be extended to the grand jury stage. In 1932 in Powell v. Alabama,6 the
Supreme Court made the rather grand statement that a person accused of
crime, "requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceed-
ings against him."T If the Court had followed its own rhetoric and actually
extended the right to counsel to "every step in the proceedings against him"
this article would not be necessary. In fact, extending the doctrine of right
to counsel has been a slow and uncertain process, still developing today,
thirty-eight years after the decision in Powell.8 Some of the uncertainty
and confusion comes from the fact that the Supreme Court has applied
different constitutional rationales in the process of extending the doctrine
to different stages. Thus, the fifth amendment was the basis for the de-
cision in Miranda v. Arizona,9 (right to counsel at custodial interrogation);
the sixth amendment was applied in Wade v. United States10 (right to
counsel at line-up); the due process dause of the fourteenth amendment
was used in Powell v. Alabama" (right to counsel at trial); and finally,
2. See Kaufman, The Grand Jury-Its Role and Its Powers, 17 F.R.D. 331
(1955) for a concise and interesting account of the history of the grand jury as
an institution in criminal justice administration.
3. E.g., Mempa v. Rlhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967); See also note 17 infra.
4. E.g., only three states specifically provide for the right to counsel at a grandjury proceeding and this right is limited. See MicH. Comr. LAws AN., CODE CaRM.
PRoc. 767.3 (1968); UTAH CODE ANN. 77-18-3 (1958), as amended, (Supp. 1969);
Rxv. CODE WASH. 10.28.075 (1961), as amended, (Supp. 1969).
5. Treadwell, Representation of the Grand Jury Subject, in CImINAL DE-
rENsE TEcHNIquEs § 6.02[l] (R. Cipes ed. 1969).
6. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
7. Id. at 69.
8. "The courts have had great difficulty in deciding in what cases, and at
what stage of a case, the right to counsel accrues." Capler v. City of Greenville,
298 F.Supp. 295, 299 (N.D. Miss. 1969).
9. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
10. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
11. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
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the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment has been cited by
the court as justification for extending the right in such cases as Douglas v.
California12 (right to counsel on appeal).
One part of the doctrine of right to counsel about which there is no
uncertainty is that it is not limited to the trial stage. As stated in a con-
curring opinion in Spano v. New York:'3
Depriving a person, formerly charged with a crime, of counsel
during the period prior to trial may be more damaging than denial
of counsel during the trial itself.14
Likewise, the doctrine has been extended to some post-trial stages, as in
Mempa v. Rhay' 5 where the Supreme Court extended the right to counsel
to the sentencing stage. 16 Extending the doctrine beyond the trial stage
has been troublesome for the courts, because the only explicit constitutional
justification for right to counsel is the somewhat drcumscript language of
the sixth amendment. The sixth amendment provides for "Assistance of
Counsel for his Defence" in "all criminal prosecutions." The phrases "coun-
sel for his defence" and "all criminal prosecutions" simply do not readily
lend themselves to the construction that counsel is required at all of the
pre and post-trial stages where it has been required thus far, because there
is no manifest indication of any real prosecution or defense at these stages.' 7
The seemingly restrictive language of the sixth amendment, and the
resulting confusion over which amendment to apply in any given case, may
have been what motivated the courts to devise the critical stage principle.
However it came about, the notion of a critical stage provides a sort of uni-
fying bridge between all of the various approaches to the right to counsel
doctrine. Even in such early cases as Powell the Supreme Court gave passing
reference to the idea of a stage being so critical that right to counsel must
be extended to it:
[D]uring perhaps the most critical period of the proceedings ...
from the time of their arraignment until the beginning of their
trial.., the defendants did not have the aid of counsel in any real
12. 372 U.S. 853 (1963).
13. 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
14. Id. at 325.
15. 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
16. The facts in Mempa v. Rhay involved a hearing to revoke probation.
However, the decision has been interpreted to encompass sentencing in its broader
aspects. See Cohen, Sentencing, Probation, and the Rehabilitative Ideal: The View
from Mempa v. Rhay, 47 TEx. L. Rxv. 1 (1968). Contra, Shaw v. Henderson, 430
F.2d 1116 (5th Cir. 1970).
17. [T]he appointment of counsel may sometimes be mandatory even
in those areas in which the Sixth Amendment does not apply. This is true
when the circumstances of a defendant or the difficulties involved in
presenting a particular matter as such that a fair and meaningful hearing
cannot be had without the aid of counsel.
Dillon v. United States, 307 F.2d 445, 446-47 (9th Cir. 1962).
[Vol. 36
4
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 2 [1971], Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol36/iss2/3
RIGHT TO COUNSEL
sense, although they were as much entitled to such aid during that
period as at the trial itself.'8
Within the last few years the critical stage rationale has been the most
often used approach to expanding the doctrine of right to counsel. Critical
stage is a functional approach to the problem rather than a definitional
approach. In other words, counsel is extended to a stage because what hap-
pens to a defendant at that stage critically affects his rights. Using this
approach, courts have made the sixth amendment phrase, "all criminal
prosecutions" synonomous with "all critical stages."'19 Thus, the following
expression is commonly found in many cases dealing with right to counsel:
[T]he Sixth Amendment, which is made applicable to the states
by the Fourteenth Amendment, requires that an accused be per-
mitted counsel at every "critical stage" of the proceedings against
him. 20
The ubiquity of the critical stage rationale provides a useful medium for
forecasting the expansion of the doctrine of right to counsel. If the elements
that make some stages critical are isolated they may then provide the basis
for arguing that right to counsel should-or should not-be extended to
some other stage under consideration.
Most cases holding a stage to be "critical" are based upon a synthesis
of two factors: the inherent nature of the stage itself; and the court's per-
ception of the role of a lawyer at that stage. This two-factor formula was
given by the Supreme Court in Wade v. United States:2 '
It calls upon us to analyze whether potential substantial prejudice
to defendant's rights inheres in the particular confrontation [stage]
and the ability of counsel to help avoid that prejudice.22
Apparently, therefore, a stage is "criticar', and right to counsel must be
provided, if the possibility of substantial prejudice to the defendant's rights
is inherent to the nature of the proceedings, and if a lawyer at that stage
could help avoid that prejudice.
The first part of the formula, dealing with the inherent potential for
prejudice, is the easiest to apply. If the proceedings will have a lasting im-
pact upon the eventual outcome of the case, then the first part of the
formula is satisfied.23 As stated by one court:
18. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57 (1932).
19. "[Olur cases have construed the Sixth Amendment guarantee to apply to
'critical' stages of the proceedings." United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967).
20. Petition of Croteau, 234 N.E.2d 737, 738 (Mass. 1968).
21. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
22. Id. at 227 (emphasis added).
23. [I]f the effectiveness of legal counsel ultimately furnished an accused
is apt, or likely, to be impaired by prior denial of counsel, the time when
such denial occurred was a "critical stage" in the judicial process, at which
time counsel should have been available to protect the constitutional
rights of the accused.
Sigler v. Bird, 354 F.2d 694, 697 (8th Cir. 1966).
1971]
5
Steele: Steele: Right to Counsel
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1971
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
A critical stage in the criminal process is thus one in which de-
fendants' rights may be lost, defenses waived, privileges claimed
or waived, or which in some other way substantially may affect
the outcome of the case.2 4
Miranda v. Arizona is a perfect example of the point under consideration.
Although Miranda dealt with the arrest stage, right to counsel was ex-
tended only to that part of the arrest stage where custodial interrogation
occurs. 25 Apparently, the court so restricted the right because the other
events that take place at the arrest stage are not likely to permanently affect
the eventual outcome of the case.26
Once the court finds that events commonly transpiring at some stage
might prejudice the defendant, the formula then calls for a further look
to see if the presence of a lawyer would serve to mitigate or avoid the po-
tential prejudice. 27 If the court determines that the presence of a lawyer
would not serve to mitigate or avoid the prejudice, then right to counsel is
not likely to be extended. Since a lawyer can play a multitude of roles, if
a court is inclined to extend the doctrine it seldom experiences any dif-
ficulty in finding a lawyer's presence essential. Courts have found a lawyer's
presence beneficial at a significant number of stages for an unclassifiable
variety of reasons: to protect the accused from coercive compulsion;2 8 to
argue for a psychiatric examination;29 to investigate the facts;3 0 to cope
with intricate legal problems;3 ' to ascertain the appropriate defense;32 to
explain available defenses;33 to protect against improper or erroneous
prosecution;3 4 to discover the prosecution's evidence;3 5 to preserve favorable
testimony;30 to lay a predicate for impeachment of unfavorable witnesses
24. State v. Williams, 97 N.J. Super. 573, 601, 235 A.2d 684, 698 (1967).
25. If authorities conclude that they will not provide counsel during a
reasonable period of time in which investigation in the field is carried out,
they may refrain from doing so without violating the person's Fifth Amend-
ment privilege so long as they do not question him during that time.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474 (1966).
26. "Of prime importance in determining whether a stage is critical is whether
information to be elidted from one at that stage will be used or is sought to be used
against him at the adjudicatory stage." Freeman v. Wilcox, 119 Ga. App. 325, 328,
167 S.E.2d 163, 166 (1969); see generally Steele, The Doctrine of Right to Counsel:
Its Impact on the Administration of Criminal Justice and the Legal Profession, 23
Sw.L.J. 488 (1969).
27. "'Critical stage' is understood to mean prosecutorial activity which has
some effect on the determination of guilt or innocence which could properly be
avoided, or mitigated, by the presence of counsel." Michigan v. Killebrew, 16 Mich.
App. 624, 627, 168 N.W.2d 423, 425 (1969).
28. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 466 (1966).
29. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9 (1970).
30. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36 (1967).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 55 (1961).
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at later stages in the proceedings;3 7 to prepare and submit the case to the
judge or jury;38 to cross examine witnesses;3 9 to poll the jury;40 and to
enter an intelligent plea to the charges. 41 The lesson to be learned from
these cases, and others like them, is that the critical stage rationale can be
as flexible and as expansive as the courts care to make it. This is not to
malign the recent expansion of the doctrine of right to counsel; to the con-
trary, the point to be made is that the only barrier to even further ex-
pansion of that doctrine is the willingness of the courts to investigate the
need for, and the role of, a lawyer at various stages in the criminal justice
process.
III. THE GRAND JURY PROCEEDING As A CRTCAL STAGE
Although the grand jury has been a part of the criminal law for
many centuries, its procedures and power are nowhere dearly de-
fined owing to its origin in the common law, a development in-
fluenced by non-legal factors, and lack of statutory darification. 42
As an institution, the grand jury originated in the Assize of Claredon
in 1611, and it eventually proved to be a bulwark between the authority of
the Crown and individual liberty.43 By 1681 the grand jury had gained
enough independence from the Crown to refuse to indict Lord Shaftsbury
for treason, in spite of the urging of King Charles 11.4 4 Eventually, the
functions of the grand jury were expanded beyond those of simply ac-
cusing individuals of crime. Particularly in the United States, the grand
jury became an enterprising investigative agency, looking into both the pub-
lic and private aspects of all sectors of life in the community.45
Over the years the use of the grand jury has diminished, largely be-
cause of statutory enactments or constitutional provisions in many states
making the grand jury an optional stage in criminal procedure.46 However,
when it is employed, the potential of the grand jury as a critical stage has
37. Id.
38. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36 (1967).
39. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9 (1970).
40. United States v. Smith, 411 F.2d 733, 736-37 (6th Cir. 1969).
41. Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 55 (1961).
42. 37 MINN. L. REv. 586, 587 (1953).
43. R. YoUNGER, THE PEOPLE'S PANEL 1 (1963); State v. Barker, 107 N.C. 913,
12 S.E. 115 (1890).
44. R. YOUNGER, THE PEopIxrs PANEtL 2 (1963).
45. For a general discussion of the development of the grand jury's investi-
gative powers, see Kuh, The Grand Jury "Presentment": Foul Blow or Fair Play?,
55 COL. L. Rnv. 1103 (1955). Special grand juries are sometimes set up to investigate
matters like organized crime over a long period of time. See Organized Crime
Control Oct. of 1970, 18 U.S.C. § 3331-34 (1970).
46. E.g., Arizona, Colorado, Indiana and Missouri; see Amiz. REv. STAT. ANN.
R. CRam. P. 78 & 79 (1956); COLO. REv. STAT. § 39-4-1 (1963), and IND. STAT. ANN.
§ 9-908 (1956); Mo. CONST. art. 1, § 17.
1971]
7
Steele: Steele: Right to Counsel
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1971
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
not diminished. 47 The Supreme Court made that fact clear in Coleman
v. Alabama48 where they expressly held that a stage can be critical, even
though it is not an essential step in the prosecution. 49
-Somewhere along the way, as the use of the grand jury has declined,
there has been a shift away from it being an independent investigative body
towards becoming a mere ritualistic part of the accusatory process. Now
the prosecutor commonly helps to organize the daily work of the grand jury
and serves as its legal counsellor.50 In fact, it has been said that grand juries
of today are mere putty in the hands of the prosecution, 51 an accusation
that is not altogether unfounded, considering the fact that most modem
grand juries merely review the evidence as gathered and presented by the
prosecutor's office. 52
Despite the fact that the thrust of the grand jury has changed from in-
vestigative to denunciative it can still provide an individual citizen with
some protection from overzealous prosecution. In the words of the United
States Supreme Court:
[T]he most valuable function of the grand jury was not only to
examine into the commission of crimes, but to stand between the
prosecutor and the accused, and to determine whether the charge
was founded upon creditable testimony or was dictated by malice
or personal ill will. 3
Thus, for the defendant being harassed by the state, the grand jury stage
is obviously crucial, or it can be, if the grand jury is aloof from the prose-
cutor's office, and performs its functions independently. When the grand
jury functions as it was designed it is one of the most important stages in
the criminal process, because it constitutes the defendant's last opportunity
47. Many states continue to require grand jury indictment in all felony cases:
e.g., Texas, New York, and Virginia-see Tax. CONsT. art. 1, § 10; N.Y. CODE CUM.
PRoc. § 4 (McKinney 1958); and CODE OF VA. § 19-1-162 (1969). Other states leave
the matter up to the defendant; e.g., Alabama and Illinois-see CODE OF AL&, Trr.
15, § 260 (1958); and ILL. ANN. STAT. § 38-111-2 (1970). Still other states use a
combination of these alternatives; e.g., Alaska and North Carolina-see Ar-s. STAT. §
12.80.020 (1962); and N.C. GN. STAT. § 15-137 (1965). See statutes cited note 1
supra.
48. 399 U.S. 1 (1970).
49. Id. at 8, 9. The court states: The preliminary hearing is not a re-
quired step in an Alabama prosecution. The prosecutor may seek an
indictment directly from the grand jury without a preliminary hearing....
However, from the fact that in cases where the accused has no lawyer at the
hearing the Alabama courts prohibit the State's use at trial of anything that
occurred at the hearing, it does not follow that the Alabama preliminary
hearing is not a 'critical stage' of the State's criminal process.
50. See generally, 37 MINN. L. REv. 586 (1953).
51. Elliff, Notes on the Abolition of the English Grand Jury, 29 J. CRIM. L.
CRIM. 8, P. S. 37 (1938).
52. See Jack v. U.S., 409 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1969) where the following
statement is made: "and the government need not produce before the Grand Jury
evidence which tends to undermine the credibility of its witnesses."
53. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 59 (1906).
[Vol. 36
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to be screened out of the system without reaching the trial court where
most defendants are eventually found guilty and punished.54
What are some aspects of a grand jury proceeding that might have a
prejudicial effect on the outcome of the case? In one sense, a grand jury
proceeding in its entirety can be prejudicial to the defendant. Consider
these facts: the prospective defendant and/or witnesses, all without counsel,
are subpoenaed to appear behind dosed doors, to be questioned by a
prosecutor before a body of men who are to decide, almost at will, whether
or not to indict for some serious crime. All of the testimony given at this
proceeding is under oath and can be stenographically recorded. Completely
unfettered by the rules of evidence or the restraints of a public hearing,
the prosecutor is free to interrogate, cross examine, discredit, or magnify
the testimony. The prosecutor is virtually at liberty to turn the grand jury
proceeding into a kind of prosecutor's practice court. On the other hand,
the defendant is denied this opportunity to preview the facts and the
witnesses because neither he nor his lawyer has an absolute right to be
present at the grand jury proceeding.
Perhaps the most prejudicial aspect of the proceeding, insofar as it
effects the defendant, is the way in which the privilege against self-in-
crimination is treated. The law seems to be that although a person under
arrest has the right to insist upon the appointment and presence of a
lawyer before he answers any questions put to him by the police, he does
not have a similar right before he answers any questions put to him by a
prosecutor in the grand jury room.55 Of course, persons appearing before
the grand jury are entitled to the privilege against self-incrimination. 56
But how effective is the privilege without having the right to counsel to
go along with it? A review of a few pertinent cases demonstrates how the
privilege against self-incrimination can be essentially useless if not bolstered
by the presence of counsel. In the first place, the average person who
appears before a grand jury is not qualified to decide for himself whether
to exercise or waive his privilege against self-incrimination. In fact, his
very manner and tone of voice before the grand jury may be incriminat-
ing.57 A person without counsel at his side could unwittingly offer de-
cisive testimony to the grand jury which he might have a perfect right to
withhold if he understood the extent of his privilege against self-incrimina-
tion. Clearly, such an occurrence is likely to have a prejudicial effect on the
eventual outcome of the case.58 In some jurisdictions the matter is made
54. TAsK FORCE ON ADMINISTRATION OF JuSTIcE, THE PRESIDENT's Com-
MISSION OF LAv ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT:
Tim COURTS 134 (1967).
55. Compare Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), with Gollaher v.
United States, 419 F.2d 520 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 960 (1969).
56. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
57. Jones v. U.S., 342 F.2d 863 (D.C. Cir. 1964); U.S. v. Degarzia, 213 F.Supp.
232 (N.D. l. 1963).
58. "Mere interrogation before a grand jury may harm the accused as much
as mere interrogation at a trial." Jones v. U.S., 342 F.2d 863, 868 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
1971]
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even worse by rulings that a grand jury witness is not even entitled to be
informed of his privilege against self-incrimination, although that witness
may be indicted upon his own testimony.59 The recent spate of cases deal-
ing with the defendant's right to be furnished a copy of all or parts of the
grand jury minutes may be taken as an implicit recognition of the fact
that grand jury proceedings can have a prejudicial effect upon the eventual
outcome of the case.0 0 For instance, recorded grand jury testimony is always
available to the prosecution, and is particularly useful in impeaching a
witness whose testimony at trial is even slightly inconsistent with his prior
testimony before the grand jury.61 Furthermore, the defendant himself
can be subpoenaed to the grand jury, and while sequestered away from his
own lawyer, he may be asked to testify. Any testimony gained in this fashion
can be introduced at the trial to impeach the defendant if he takes the
stand.0 2
Other features of the grand jury proceeding can have a prejudicial
effect. In a recent Nevada case,63 two suspects were ushered into the grand
jury room while the prosecutrix was testifying about an alleged rape.
After a few moments, the two suspects were taken out of the room, where-
upon the prosecutrix identified both of them for the grand jury as the
guilty parties. With this tactic the prosecutor was able to successfully avoid
the requirements for the use of a line-up set by the Supreme Court in the
case of Wade v. United States.64 As long as the defendant is without counsel
there is no end to the imaginative use that can be made of the grand jury
by a reasonably intelligent prosecutor who desires to "cinch" his case.
Surely, the grand jury proceeding must be characterized as an anomaly in
the criminal justice process, for it is a stage with all the inherently preju-
dicial features that make other stages "critical", and yet the right to counsel
has not been extended to it.
59. The mere possibility that the witnmess may later be indicted furnishes
no basis for requiring that he be advised of his rights under the V Amend-
ment when summoned to give testimony before a Grand Jury... [w]hile
the government may not practice deception, fraud or duress upon an
accused to obtain evidence, it is not required to advise him of his rights
as to self-incrimination.
United States v. Gilboy, 160 F. Supp. 442, 461 (N.D.Pa. 1958); see also United States
v. Luxenberg 374 F.2d 241 (6th Cir. 1967); United States v. Scully, 225 F.2d 113
(2d Cir. 1955); contra, N.Y. v. Dudish, 5 Misc.2d 856, 166 N.Y.Supp.2d 810 (1957).
60. Dennis v. United States, 584 U.S. 855 (1966); Palermo v. United States,
360 U.S. 343 (1959); United States v. Battaglia, 410 F.2d 279 (7th Cir. 1969); Fra.
R. Cium. P. 16 (a) (3).
61. United States v. Insana, 423 F.2d 1165 (2d Cir. 1970); Gutgesell v. State, 43
S.W. 1016 (Tex. Grim. App. 1898). But see United States v. Franklin, 429 F.2d 247
(8th Cir. 1970).
62. Gollaher v. United States, 419 F.2d 520 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 960 (1969); see generally, Comment, The Rights of a Witness Before the Grand
Jury, 1967 DuKE L.J. 97.
63. Maiden v. State, 442 P.2d 902 (Nev. 1968).
64. 388 U.S. 218, 224, 233 (1967) (the Court criticizing the practice of allowing
an eye witness to identify a suspect alone in a suggestive situation).
[Vol. 86
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Since courts will not extend the doctrine of right to counsel to a
stage where presence of counsel serves no useful purpose, some attention
must be given to defining the role a lawyer might play if right to counsel
was extended to grand jury proceedings. Without any doubt, one of the
major counter indications to the appointment of a lawyer at the grand
jury stage is that his presence might (and probably would) disrupt the
traditional order and format of the proceedings. If the prosecutor was
confronted with the presence of a lawyer for the defendant, it would tend to
diminish his unbridled domination of the grand jury. Therefore, when
searching for potential lawyer roles at the grand jury stage, one must con-
sider the locus of the performance. Should the lawyer be physically present
in the grand jury room, or should he be relegated to a seat in the hallway
outside the grand jury door? The answer to that question ultimately af-
fects the kind of role the lawyer can play at the grand jury stage.65
Some jurisdictions have already informally adopted the practice of
allowing witnesses appearing before the grand jury to confer with their
lawyers in the hallways. 66 Furthermore, that practice has been expressly ap-
proved by a few courts,6 7 although explicit court approval does not seem
necessary to its existence. The only way to judicially insure the presence
of a lawyer in every case is to hold that a grand jury proceeding is a critical
stage. But it can not be a critical stage unless the lawyer has a significant
role to play, and how can a lawyer play a significant role if he is barred
from the room where the proceedings are taking place? The notion of re-
stricting the lawyer to the hallway is excessively mechanistic, if not alto-
gether absurd. Wherever he might be located, what services could a lawyer
perform for his client at the grand jury stage? A list of such services might
provide some insight into the necessity (or lack of necessity) for having a
lawyer present. A speculative, and merely partial, list of such services
follows: 68
1. Assist the witness in the exercise or waiver of his privilege against
self-incrimination.
2. Protect any testimonial privilege that may be threatened, such as
attorney-client, doctor-patient.
3. Guard against unwarranted intrusion into the witness's privacy
from questions having no bearing on the matter under investigation.
4. Police the proceedings and record or attempt to prevent unfair
practices, such as using the proceedings to avoid the import of the Miranda
or Wade decisions.
65. See pp. 210-11 for a discussion of the traditional secrecy of the grand
jury proceedings as it affects the question of whether or not counsel should be
allowed in the grand jury room.
66. U.S. v. Corallo, 413 F.2d 1306, 1330 (2d Cir. 1969); 26 WASH. 8: LEE L. R v.
97 (1969).
67. E.g., People v. Ianniello, 21 N.Y.2d 418, 235 N.E.2d 439 (1968), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 827 (1968).
68. See generally, People v. Ianniello, 21 N.Y.2d 418, 235 N.E.2d 439 (1968),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 827 (1968).
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5. Observe the demeanor of all witnesses and discover their testi-
mony.69
6. Search for any elements of the alleged offense that are missing from
the evidence presented, and perhaps advise the grand jury of these missing
elements.
7. Enhance the client's chances of being no-billed by pointing up all
exclupatory or mitigating evidence.
A lawyer could certainly perform some of these services from the hall-
way outside the grand jury room. But such an arrangement would in all
probability lessen the effectiveness of the proceedings due to the constant
need of the defendant to leave the room to consult with his lawyer. The
relative merits of having the lawyer remain outside the grand jury room, as
opposed to being present inside the grand jury room, were discussed in the
case of Sheriden v. Garrison.70 The district attorney argued that Sheriden's
lawyer should remain outside because Sheriden would be allowed to step
out from time to time to consult with him. The court responded as follows:
The problem here is that Sheriden will be forced outside the pres-
ence of counsel to match legal wits with the District Attorney,
Charged as a criminal, he will sit before a grand jury, forced to
undergo interrogation outside the presence of his lawyer, required
to decide at his peril and without the benefit of counsel present at
the time whether any particular question relates to [the crime with
which he is charged.] 7 '
Should the lawyer be barred from the grand jury because of the reper-
cussions his presence would have on the proceedings? It can be argued that
hearings before the grand jury will become adversary proceedings-a kind
of mini pre-trial. Such dire predictions are faintly reminiscent of comments
once made after the Miranda and Wade decisions about the demise of
custodial interrogations or line-ups, all of which were refuted by subse-
quent experience.72 Presence of a lawyer at a hearing does not necessarily
turn it into a contentious or adversary proceeding, anymore than presence
of a physician at an execution turns it into a medical treatment.
69. This particular role of the lawyer would undoubtedly offend those who
feel that the defendant should be denied access to the statements of witnesses
against him, at least until trial, under the "particularized need" doctrine; Dennis v.
United States, 384 U.S. 855 (1966). However, it is submitted that the present right
of the defendants to discover grand jury testimony prior to trial is really no right
at all, because it may be effectively sabotaged by simply failing to record the grandjury testimony: "Furthermore, there is no requirement that grand jury proceedings
be recorded or transcribed." Jack v. U.S., 409 F.2d 522 (9th Cir. 1969).
70. 273 F.Supp. 673 (E.D. La. 1967), reversed on other grounds, 415 F.2d 699
(5th Cir. 1969).
71. Id., at 684.
72. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S.
218 (1967). See Comment, Interrogations in New Haven: The Impact of Miranda,
76 YALE L.J. 1519 (1967), where the conclusion is drawn, after an eleven week
period of observation and study of interrogations in New Haven, that Miranda
[Vol. 36
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Any tendency of the lawyer to "interfere" with the grand jury could be
avoided completely by rules of procedure, just as there are presently rules
for that very purpose at the trial stage. For instance, rules might deny the
lawyer the right to ask questions during the proceedings but provide that
he may submit a list of suggested questions to the foreman, to be used
at his discretion. Although the lawyer might be granted some opportunity
to give his opinion as to the chances of conviction, the rules could be writ-
ten so as to deny him the opportunity to make a pyrotechnic summation.
Currently, the grand jury is informed (implicitly at least) of the prosecu-
tor's estimate of the chances of conviction when he recommends indict-
ment. The validity of that recommendation would certainly be enhanced if
the grand jury had the benefit of a reasoned opinion from the suspect's
own lawyer in those cases where he cared to comment. Such a procedure
would force the prosecutor to exercise more responsibility in screening
cases before presenting them to the grand jury and would also improve the
grand jury's capacity to weed out cases that should not have been pre-
sented.
In many instances the person under investigation by the grand jury
is never called to testify. 73 Should such a person have the right to counsel?
Admittedly, this is a difficult issue. Some of the reasons for appointing
counsel in other cases are no longer valid when the client is not present.
But the prejudicial nature of a grand jury proceeding is not substantially
altered by the absence of the person being investigated. A person's entitle-
ment to the services of a lawyer should not be dependent upon the whims of
the grand jury in calling, or not calling, that person to appear. If the grand
jury receives what it considers to be sufficient evidence to indict without
even hearing from the person under investigation, then that may well be
the time of greatest need for protection from possible prejudice.
Secret indictments could no longer be obtained if right to counsel was
extended to every person under investigation by the grand jury. Any con-
clusion about the value of secret indictments to law enforcement, as com-
pared to the value of right to counsel to protection of individual liberty,
warnings "will not silence suspects and therefore will not cripple law enforcement
as critics have claimed." 384 U.S. at 1577. For a psychological study of some of the
reasons why suspects confess even where Miranda warnings are given, see Driver,
Confessions and the Social Psychology of Coercion, 82 HAzv. L. REv. 42 (1968). See
also Medalie, Zeitz & Alexander, Custodial Police Interrogation in our Nation's
Capitol: The Attempt to Implement Miranda, 66 MicH. L. Rav. 1347 (1968).
For a general discussion of the effect on Wade on the line-up process, see
Read, Lawyers at Lineups: Constitutional Necessity or Avoidable Extravagance,
17 U.C.L.A. L. Rzv. 339 (1969-1970). The author concludes that the lawyer is
largely impotent at the lineup even in those jurisdictions which seek to fully
implement Wade, and that Wade has had little impact on the lineup process.
73. "There is no right on the part of one whose conduct is being investigated
by a grand jury to petition the grand jury or to appear before it, which is guaranteed
by the Constitution or otherwise .... " Duke v. United States, 90 F.2d 840, 841
(4th Cir. 1937). Accord, United States ex-rel. McCann v. Thompson, 144 F.2d 604
(2d Cir. 1944); Steigler v. Superior Court, 252 A.2d 300 (Del. 1969).
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must necessarily rest upon personal viewpoints.7 4 The dilemma of protect-
ing individual rights while protecting society is the essence of criminal law
and procedure. Perhaps all that can fairly be said at this point in the de-
velopment of Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence is that individual
rights are often favored over the power of the State, so there is nothing
revolutionary in the idea of sacrificing secret indictments in favor of right to
counsel.
One final comment should be made before this discussion of lawyer
roles at the grand jury stage is closed. There is reason to believe that most
people would waive right to counsel if it were extended to the grand jury
stage. That has been the experience at some other stages where right to
counsel has been extended.75 And when given the opportunity, people seem
inclined to waive the grand jury proceeding itself.76 Therefore, extending
the right to counsel might make very little over-all difference in present
grand jury procedures. Then why bother? Because, the choice of whether
or not to have counsel should lie with the defendant who is, after all, the
one with the most at stake in the grand jury proceeding. If the stability of
the grand jury is actually so delicate that it will be adversely affected by the
presence of a lawyer, then the grand jury as an institution is suspect, and
the arguments for the presence of a lawyer are enhanced by that fact.
74. In balancing the interests of the accused and the state it is interesting to
note that the secret indictment process has been severely criticized, see Dession 9:
Cohen, The Inquisitional Functions of Grand Juries, 41 YAImx L.J. 687 (1932). In
considering the merits of the secret indictment it should also be borne in mind
that while the functions of grand juries have diminished, the activities of other
groups such as legislative committees have increased. Although these other pro-
ceedings are also subject to abuse, the fact that they are public does give the
accused an opportunity to learn who is making the charges and some idea of what
kind of charge is being made against him. See generally, Konowitz, The Grand Jury
As an Investigating Body, 10 St. JoHN's L. Rnv. 219 (1936).
75. As was indicated in the post-Wade and post-Miranda studies (supra note
72), defendants often waive their right to counsel at the interrogation and lineup
stages for various reasons. Defendants also waive their right to counsel at trial and
may often do so through the device of a guilty plea. For a good discussion of the
waiver of counsel by defendants through the means of a guilty plea, including
statistical studies, see L. SiLvERsTEN, D-FENcE OF THE POOR IN CRaMnNAL CASES IN
AMERICAN STATE CouRrs 89-104 (1965).
One of the factors which induce defendants to waive counsel, as discussed by
Mr. Silverstein, is the fact that the defendant may not be offered counsel until
comparatively late in process of criminal justice administration (e.g., after indict-
ment) and by this time he may have already decided to waive counsel and plead
guilty. Also, as pointed out by Mr. Silverstein, some defendants are unaware of what
the court means when it advises them they are entitled to "counsel". Other factors
involved in the waiver of right to counsel are the cost, the feeling on the part of
the defendant that he can defend himself adequately, and the desire to "get it over
with" and start the sentence to be imposed so that parole can be obtained earlier.
See 49 MwN. L. Ruv. 1133 (1965).
76. See Orfield, The Trend: The Constitutionality of Waiver of Indictment in
Federal Criminal Cases, 21 RocKy MT. L. Rxv. 76 (1948), in which the author lists
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IV. THE CASE LAW
The previous sections of this writing centered upon a theoretical con-
struct for extending the doctrine of right to counsel to the grand jury
stage. Now the emphasis will shift to the statutory and case law as it actually
exists today. The attempt is to demonstrate that what has been presented
herein as a proposal is, in fact, already the law in a few jurisdictions at
least. At the outset it must be admitted that most court decisions expressly
deny the right to counsel at the grand jury stage.77 That denial is usually
couched in such language as: "it has never been held"78 or "it is familiar
law that witnesses [before a grand jury] have no right to counsel." 79 The
implicit assumption in these cases is that appointment of counsel at the
grand jury stage is not a tenable concept. One gets the feeling from the
opinions that extending counsel to the grand jury stage would somehow do
violence to the fundamental precepts of Anglo-American criminal pro-
cedure. In that light it might be helpful to re-examine the historical de-
velopment of the notion that a person is not entitled to a lawyer at the
grand jury stage.
One of the earliest cases on the subject is In re Black s0 decided by the
United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in 1931. Right
to counsel at the grand jury stage was denied in that case because "[a]
witness is not entitled to be furnished with facilities for evading issues or
concealing true facts."81 The court further stated: "A witness must rely
for any needed protection upon his personal privilege against self in-
crimination to be invoked when the occasion arises."8 2 Twenty-six years
later, the Supreme Court of the United States considered the problem in
In re Groban.8 3 Following the same philosophy used by the Second Circuit
in Black, the Supreme Court made this statement in the Groban opinion:
A witness before a grand jury cannot insist, as a matter of con-
stitutional right, on being represented by his counsel, nor can a
witness before other investigative bodies.... Obviously in these
situations evidence obtained may possibly lay a witness open to
criminal charges. When such charges are made in a criminal pro-
ceeding, he then may demand the presence of his counsel for his
defense. Until then, his protection is the privilege against self in-
crimination.8 4
77. E.g., Harris v. State, 450 S.W.2d 629 (Tex. Grim. App. 1970), "We note
further that we are aware of no authority giving an accused who voluntarily appears
before the grand jury the right to be accompanied by his counsel." 450 S.W.2d at
630. Presley v. State, 6 Md. App. 419, 251 A.2d 622 (1969), "Presley's complaint that
it was error to deny his request to appear before the Grand Jury is without merit
since an accused has no such right." Id. at 428, 251 A.2d at 626-27.
78. United States v. Levinson, 405 F.2d 971, 980 (6th Cir. 1968).
79. Perrone v. United States, 416 F.2d 464, 465 (2d Cir. 1969).
80. 47 F.2d 542 (2d Cir. 1931).
81. Id. at 543.
82. Id. at 544.
83. 352 U.S. 330 (1957). Although Groban actually involved a fire marshal's
inquest, the Court made liberal allusions to grand jury proceedings.
84. Id. at 333.
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One may reasonably conclude that the denial of right to counsel was
originally based upon the proposition that the opportunity to invoke the
privilege against self-incrimination obviated any need for presence of
counsel.
Taken in the context of the law as it existed in 1957, when Groban was
decided, there can be no quarrel with the Supreme Court decision. That
was an era when right to counsel was occasioned by a need for "funda-
mental fairness essential to the very concept of justice."85 To further ob-
fuscate matters, "fundamental fairness" was measured on a case by case
basis by "the sum total of the circumstances."8 6 The Supreme Court was of
the opinion that right to counsel should not exist at any stage if it "would
constrict state police activities in a manner that in many instances might
impair their ability to solve difficult cases." 8 7
Even the casual student of criminal law is aware of the shift in attitudes
concerning the right to counsel since Groban was decided in 1957. One
example of this shifting emphasis is the birth of the critical stage rationale
as explained above. The Supreme Court opinion in Miranda v. Arizona,88
decided in 1966, further exemplifies the change in the thinking of the
Court since Groban. The significance of the Miranda case is shown by
the following quotation taken from it:
Even preliminary advice given to the accused by his own attorney
can be swiftly overcome by the secret interrogation process. Thus,
the need for counsel to protect the Fifth Amendment privilege
comprehends not merely a right to consult with counsel prior to
questioning, but also to have counsel present during any question-
ing if the defendant so desires. [citations omitted] 89
Although Miranda is limited to interrogations where the witness is in
custody, the Supreme Court subsequently held that a person in his own
bedroom could be in custody.9 0 The pressures upon a person subpoenaed to
testify before a grand jury are certainly as decisive as those operating upon
a person undergoing any other type of custodial interrogation. In other
words, it can be argued that a person subpoenaed before a grand jury needs
counsel for exactly the same reasons that a person being interrogated by
the police needs counsel. In fact, some courts are already applying that
analogy.9 1 The older holdings in Black and Groban that a witness before a
grand jury is amply protected by his ability to exercise his privilege against
85. Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 439 (1958).
86. Id at 440.
87. Cicenia v. Lagay, 357 U.S. 504, 509 (1958).
88. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
89. Id. at 470.
90. Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969).
91. State v. Ruggeri, 19 Utah 216, 429 P.2d 969 (1967), Compare Sheridan v.
Garrison, 273 F.Supp. 673 (E.D.La. 1967), reversed on other grounds, 415 F.2d 699
(5th Cir. 1969), with State v. Nelson, 202 So.2d 232 (Fla. 1967).
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self-incrimination are simply out of character when juxtaposed against cases
like Miranda and Coleman.92 As one court pointed out:
It imposes a serious problem for the witness to determine at his
peril whether the questions put to him are themselves innocuous,
or incriminatory, or may potentially lead to the discovery of in-
criminating evidence. Certainly no one would elect to fence with
the District Attorney and the grand jury with their own foils at
the peril of a possible term in prison.9 3
Several federal circuits are now following a practice of advising witnesses of
a right to consult with an attorney during their grand jury testimony.94
At least one case has recognized that a modern grand jury may be no
more than an arm of the prosecutor's office, thus creating a necessity for
presence of counsel to assist an accused during the proceedings. 95 Jones
v. United States98 is also instructive on that issue. In Jones the defendant
was arrested and taken before a magistrate and a lawyer was appointed.
However, when the defendant was subsequently taken before the grand
jury, the lawyer was not notified. Three of the circuit judges voted to re-
verse the conviction that resulted, stating:
Indictment is a crucial "step in the proceedings against" the
accused. The right which he has at other crucial stages does not
jump the time just before indictment .... By failing to inform
counsel of the impending examination, the prosecution deprived
[the defendant] of his assistance at a crucial time and greatly to
[his] prejudice.97
At the state level, a few legislatures have taken the initiative away
from the courts by passing statutes creating a right to counsel at the grand
jury stage.98 The language of the Utah statute is typical:
... Any person called to testify before a grand jury must be advised
of his constitutional right to be represented by counsel and his
right not to say anything that may incriminate himself. Upon a
demand by such person for representation [by] counsel the pro-
ceedings must be delayed until counsel is present. In the event that
counsel of his choice is not available, said individual shall be re-
92. 399 U.S. 1 (1970) (right to counsel extended to preliminary hearings to
insure that rights of accused are fully protected at that stage).
93. Sheridan v. Garrison, 273 F.Supp. 673, 679 (E.D.La. 1967), reversed on
other grounds, 415 F.2d 699 (5th Cir. 1969).
94. E.g., Perrone v. United States, 416 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1969); United States
v. Coralo, 413 F.2d 1306 (2d Cir. 1969); United States v. Irwin, 354 F.2d 192(2d Cir. 1965).
95. Sheridan v. Garrison, 273 F.Supp. 673, 676-77 (E.D. La. 1967), reversed on
other grounds, 415 F.2d 699 (5th Cir. 1096).
96. 342 F.2d 863, 870 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
97. Id. at 870-71.
98. See MicH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 767.3 (1968); UTAH CoDE ANN. § 77-19-3
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quired to obtain other counsel in order that the work of the grand
jury go forward.... o9
In summary, it appears that a few cases and statutes extend the right to
counsel to the grand jury stage, but they clearly represent a minority view-
point. In the main, courts continue to follow the historical precept that the
fifth amendment is adequate protection for a witness before the grand jury.
No case has been found dealing with the right to counsel of a person
being investigated by the grand jury, but not called to appear before it.
As discussed previously, the desirability of allowing counsel to be present
when a case is considered, whether the client is present or not, depends upon
the conclusion reached after balancing the equities between protecting the
individual on the one hand and preserving the secrecy of grand jury pro-
ceedings on the other. It might be helpful to examine the traditional
idea that grand jury proceedings must be secret.10 0 At least three separate
reasons are usually given for preserving the secrecy of grand jury proceed-
ings.
1. Secrecy allows the grand jurors to meet and deliberate without fear
of retaliation.1 0 '
2. Secrecy encourages witnesses to come forward and testify fully.' 02
3. Secrecy protects the accused from irreparable damage if no in-
indictment is found. 03
These reasons may have been valid at one time. Today they seem unrealistic
if not altogether ridiculous. For example, the fact that named grand jurors
meet to consider a particular case is usually a matter of public record and
is frequently the subject of newspaper coverage. Therefore, the mere fact
that deliberations are secret is no guarantee against retaliation directed
towards the grand jury members. Similar reasoning applies to the notion
that secrecy encourages witnesses to testify. Witnesses are just that; and as
such must necessarily expect to be contacted by persons interested in the
case. If an indictment is returned (as is usually the case) they will have to
face the defendant and his lawyer sooner or later. In fact, it could be argued
that the grand jury would be better assured the truth from witnesses if their
testimony was given in the presence of the defendant's lawyer than in
99. UTAu CODE ANN. § 77-19-3 (1953), as amended, (Supp. 1969).
100. It is, of course, a familiar proposition that the lawyer for a witness is
not entitled to be present in the Grand Jury room [citations omitted].
This rule rests upon the statutory exclusion of all except certain authorized
persons before the Grand Jury and the need to preserve the secrecy of the
Grand Jury proceedings.
People v. Ianniello, 21 N.Y.2d 418, 423, 235 N.E.2d 439, 442 (1968), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 827 (1968).
101. See State v. Rothrock, 45 Nev. 214, 222, 200 P. 525, 527 (1921).
102. Howard v. State, 60 Ga. App. 229, 235, 4 S.E.2d 418, 423-24 (1939).
103. For other possible reasons for secrecy see Calkins, Abolition of the Grand
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the usual case where they testify without that restraining influence. The last
reason in the list-that secrecy protects the accused from irreparable damage
where no indictment is found-is no less than patently absurd. As previously
mentioned, the public is usually well aware of the fact that a person is under
investigation by the grand jury, so the suspicion is already cast. If it is ever
removed, it is because the suspect is ultimately no-billed, and not because
the proceedings are secret. And since the reason for secrecy is to protect the
suspect, there should be no reluctance to grant that suspect the right to
waive his so-called protection to the extent of having his own counsel
present.
There never has been a great deal of unanimity over the issue of secret
grand jury proceedings. Exceptions have always been made in one form or
another when the interests of justice seem to call for it. Even as early as
1902 one court commented:
Independent of statutory regulation, courts in different states hold
widely divergent views upon the question as to whether it is com-
petent for members of a grand jury to testify as to what occurred
in the grand-jury room.104
Courts have declared the right of the father of a timid young girl to ac-
company her into the grand jury room during the investigation of a rape
case,105 and the right of private counsel for the deceased's estate to be
present during the investigation of the death.10 6 Many courts have rec-
ognized that secrecy does not prohibit a witness from discussing the grand
jury proceedings with his own attorney.' 07 The liberalizing of discovery
practice in criminal cases has neutralized many of the old arguments in
favor of grand jury secrecy. Now a defendant is entitled to a copy of the
grand jury minutes if they are needed to insure the full and fair cross-
examination of a witness.10 8 In addition, recent amendments to Rule
16 (a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure indicate that a defendant
is entitled in all cases to a copy of his own testimony before a grand jury.109
As discussed earlier, cases denying right to counsel at the grand jury
stage are usually based upon the proposition that the fifth amendment is
adequate protection for a witness. There is a conflict between that his-
torical approach and the newer critical stage concept. Some courts and
legislatures have broken with tradition by recognizing the desirability of
providing counsel at the grand jury stage. But one should not expect a
104. Pritchett v. Frisby, 112 Ky. 503, 504, 66 S.W. 503, 504 (1902). Cf. Misso v.
State, 61 TFx. lCum. 135 S.W. 1173 (1911).
105. People v. Arnold, 248 IM. 169, 93 N.E. 786 (1910).
106. Tiner v. State, 109 Ark. 138, 158 S.W. 1087 (1913).
107. E.g. Goodman v. United States, 108 F.2d 516 (9th Cir. 1939).
108. Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855 (1966); United States v. Tanner, 279
F.Supp. 457, 472 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
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growing movement toward uniform recognition of a right to counsel at the
grand jury stage. To the contrary, the forecast is for continued denial of
that right in most instances. This pessimism results from two recent Supreme
Court cases-Hannah v. Larche" o and Jenkins v. McKeithen."'1
Hannah v. Larche dealt with the power of the Civil Rights Commission
to deny a person access to the names of those who accused him of violating
their civil rights and to also deny him the right to confront and cross-ex-
amine those persons before the Commission.1" 2 The Supreme Court found
that the purpose of the Commission was to find facts, not to "indict, punish,
or impose any legal sanctions.""u 3 The Court concluded that the full
panoply of due process rights was not necessary because "the requirements of
due process frequently vary with the type of proceeding involved...,114
Hannah stands for the proposition that something less than complete due
process is required before certain tribunals, but what makes it particularly
important to the topic under discussion is that the Supreme Court charac-
terized the grand jury as one such tribunal:
Undoubtedly, the procedural rights claimed by respondents have
not been extended to grand jury hearings because of the disrup-
tive influence their injection would have on the proceedings, and
also because the grand jury merely investigates and reports. It
does not try.11
If there was any doubt about the meaning of Hannah vis-a-vis the
grand jury it was dispelled in the subsequent case of Jenkins v. McKeithen.
In that case the Supreme Court was called upon to decide the constitution-
ality of a Louisiana statute creating the Labor-Management Commission of
Inquiry. The purpose of the Commission was the "investigation and find-
ings of facts relating to violations or possible violations of criminal laws of
the state of Louisiana or of the United States arising out of or in connection
with matters in the field of labor-management relations .... ,"16 The
Court found that the Commission "clearly exercises an accusatory function;
it is empowered to be used and allegedly is used to find named individuals
guilty of violating the criminal laws of Louisiana and the United States and
to brand them as criminals in public.""' 7 The Court went on to hold that
all of the requirements of due process, such as right to confrontation and
cross-examination and the right of the accused to present evidence in his
110. 363 U.S. 420 (1960).
111. 395 U. S. 411 (1969).
112. Right to counsel was not an issue in Hannah, because the rules of the
Commission allowed any witness to be accompanied by his own counsel, 363 U.S. at
431-432.
113. Id. at 441.
114. Id. at 440.
115. Id. at 449.
116. 395 U.S. at 414.
117. Id. at 428.
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own behalf, must be afforded by the Commission.118 The Court did not
reach the question of right to effective assistance of counsel,119 but it did
make a comment about the applicability of the decision to grand jury pro-
ceedings:
We do not mean to say that this same analysis applies to
every body which has an accusatory function. The grand jury, for
example, need not provide all the procedural guarantees alleged
by appellant to be applicable to the Commission. As this court
noted in Hannah, "The grand jury merely investigates and reports.
It does not try." Moreover, "[t]he functions of that institution and
its constitutional prerogatives are rooted in long centuries of
Anglo-American history." [citations omitted]12 0
Reading the Hannah and Jenkins opinions together, there is little
room to doubt what the Supreme Court would do if directly confronted
with the problem of whether or not to extend the doctrine of right to
counsel to the grand jury stage-it would undoubtedly decline to do so.
Both in Hannah, and again in Jenkins, the Court has shown its predilection
to avoid any "disruptive influence" upon the grand jury, a body the Court
sees as having "constitutional prerogatives ... rooted in long centuries of
Anglo-American history." In other words, the Court has chosen to treat
the grand jury as unique-an exception to the entire catena of cases that
have superimposed constitutional rights, such as right to counsel, upon
various stages of the criminal process. If the Supreme Court holds to the
view that the grand jury is sacrosanct because of its historical origins, it
will remain a no-man's land insofar as individual constitutional rights are
concerned. At this point in time perhaps the only hope for improvement
lies in the fact that over the years the Supreme Court has distinguished
itself by decisions that have enlarged upon Anglo-American history and
tradition, rather than being limited by it.
CONCLUSION
No doubt it would be a boon to prosecutors if they could summon
before a Grand Jury a person against whom an indictment is being
sought and there interrogate him, isolated from the protection of
counsel and presiding judge and insulated from the critical ob-
servation of the public. But there is a serious question whether our
jurisprudence, fortified by constitutional declaration, permits that
procedure. Powell v. United States.'21
Despite numerous expressions of concern, similar to the above quota-
tion, the law of right to counsel at the grand jury stage remains essentially
118. Id. at 429.
119. Id. at 430.
120. Id.
121. 226 F.2d 269, 274 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
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unchanged. For some vague and undefined reason, conceptions about the
grand jury have remained static although our perceptions about other
stages of the criminal process, and the individual rights appurtenant to
them, have undergone significant changes. In 1967 the Supreme Court of the
United States said, "today's law enforcement machinery involves critical
confrontations of the accused by the prosecution at pre-trial proceedings
where the results might well settle the accused's fate and reduce the trial
to a mere formality."'122 From the standpoint of the accused, the grand jury
proceeding is just such a "critical confrontation." The potential for last-
ing prejudice inherent in any particular grand jury proceeding will vary
from case to case, but as the Supreme Court itself has said, "The right to
have the assistance of counsel is too fundamental and absolute to allow
courts to indulge in nice calculations as to the amount of prejudice arising
from its denial."123
We have reached a phase where we grant a suspect right to counsel
if he is placed in a line-up or interrogated by a police department, but we
deny a suspect counsel if he is paraded before, or interrogated by, a grand
jury. The justification for that apparent incongruity is historical prece-
dent. And yet, most of the grand jury's historical function has withered
from disuse. Given the cadre of trained police available today, there is
practically no need for investigation by a grand jury. In today's world the
grand jury has become a screening mechanism instead of an investigative
body. This shift in emphasis from a body that investigated to a body that
screens should be recognized and considered whenever decisions are being
made about right to counsel at the grand jury stage. Too often the con-
tinued denial of right to counsel is justified with rhetoric reminiscent of
the old, traditional conceptions of the grand jury function. Now that the
grand jury serves a new and modem purpose, it behooves us to re-examine
some of the rationale that has led to the general accepted proposition that
there is no right to counsel at the grand jury stage of criminal proceedings.
122. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967).
123. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 76 (1942).
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